The European Union (EU) has faced one of its biggest crises with the rise of population inflows through its Eastern and Southern neighbours as well as movements within the Union. In 2016, the main debate that dominated Europe was on restricting migration within and into the EU along with concerns and objections to the refugee quota systems and the sharing of the burden among member states. Turkey emerged as a 'gate keeper' in this crisis and has since been at the centre of debates because of the large Syrian refugee population in the country and billions of Euros it was promised to prevent refugees travelling to Europe. The Syrian crisis produced over 4.8 million refugees with over 2.8 million were based in Turkey by the end of 2016. Turkey with its generous support for Syrian refugees has been confirmed as a 'country of security'. This shadows the darker side of affairs as the very same country has also produced millions of asylum seekers since the 1980 military coup. Current circumstances and fresh evidence indicate that there will be more EU bound refugees coming through and from Turkey.
Introduction
On 18 November 2016, NATO's Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg said "some Turkish officers working in NATO command structure… have requested asylum in the countries where they are working" months after the failed coup attempt in Turkey and the purges that followed.
1 This is simply adding fuel to the fire in Europe. The European Union (EU) has faced one of its biggest crises with the rise of population flows through its Eastern and Southern neighbours as well as movements within the EU. In 2016, the Brexit referendum and debates surrounding it in the UK were largely focused on restricting EU immigration to the UK whereas eastern and central European members were raising concerns about and reluctant to comply with the refugee quota proposals and the burden sharing they often included 2 .
The Syrian crisis has displaced millions in the country (Yazgan et al., 2015) . At least 4, 810, 710 Syrians (2, 823, 987 in Turkey alone) were registered as refugees 3 abroad by 26 September 2016 (UNHCR, 2016 . While 494,411 of these refugees lived in camps the overwhelming majority remained outside camps and relied on their own means. According to the UNHCR, 1,177,914 Syrians filed asylum applications in Europe and about two thirds of these were lodged in Germany (449, 770) , Serbia and Kosovo (314, 852) , Sweden (109, 664), and Hungary (76, 116) .
Turkey has been known as a source country (and therefore, I define it as a "country of insecurity") for international population movements until very recently. Currently, Turkey qualifies as a country of immigration (hence called a "country of security") with about 4 per cent of its inhabitants being refugees, and another 2 percent being non-refugee foreign borns by 2016. By the end of December 2016, 2,823,987 Syrian refugees registered in the country (DGMM, 2016) represent about 55 percent of the total displaced Syrian population. Turkey also accommodates about 300,000 refugees from other countries. 4 Despite these incoming movers registering under international temporary protection, Turkey has not ceased to be a country of insecurity (meaning source country). There are still strong outflows and increased mobility among Turkish citizens (as well as among others who arrived as refugees, see Genç & Öner, 2016) while large diaspora populations exist in countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland .
In this article, the impact of recently increased insecurity in Turkey on emigration pressures is discussed in terms of number of asylum applications lodged by Turkish citizens. These flows are directed to traditional destinations for movers from Turkey following migration networks as well as legal frameworks and political perceptions. Current statistics of Syrian arrivals in Turkey as a country of security are also presented. Hence, the article shows how a country like Turkey swings between 'insecurity' and 'security' over time and in relation to conflict. Based on current asylum flows, Turkey appear as a country of relative (in)security that both receives and produces significant number of refugees.
2 For an overview of the EU level burden sharing issues from 2010 and 2015 see: Thielemann et al. (2010) and Carrera et al. (2015) . 3 We should note though that Turkey is one of very few countries that impose a geographical restriction on the 1951 Geneva convention by not accepting refugees from outside Europe. Therefore, Syrian refugees in Turkey are officially registered under temporary protection regime and often referred to as "guests". For details see Öner & Genç (2015), pp.254-255. 4 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 also http://www.goc.gov.tr/ icerik6/uluslararasi-koruma_363_378_4712_icerik. Accessed 4/10/2016.
Growing refugee flows and Turkey
The total number of international movers according to the widely used definition of changing place of residence for 12 months or longer from one country to another is about 3.4 per cent (about 250 million) (Figure 1 ). Refugees comprised an even smaller segment of the total of 244 million migrants in 2016. Among over 65.3 million displaced people, only 21 million were refugees by the summer of 2016, representing an increase from 16 million in 2015 (Sirkeci & Martin, 2016:329; Martin, 2016:305) . Despite the animosity over migration in the debates in the decade to 2016, international migration is still not a norm but exception (Martin & Sirkeci, 2017:573) . This is more or less also true for Turkey where about 5% of the population is made up by immigrants, even in the face of a mass inflow of millions of Syrians in the past five years. International migration is driven by three Ds: development (or economic) deficit (referring to adverse economic conditions marked by inequalities across society and geography), democratic deficit (referring to presence of representation issues, particularly for minorities), and demographic deficit (characterised by high fertility and growth rates), between and within countries at a time when revolutions in communications, transportation, and rights make it easier to learn about opportunities abroad, travel, and stay abroad. The recent failed military coup in Turkey highlighted the three Ds in the country and thus added to migration challenges in Europe because (a) Turkey may not be considered "safe" anymore and (b) there is an increasing number of Turkish citizens and others fleeing the country in response to the emergency rule since the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016 and increasing number of terror attacks. Growing perception of insecurity among Turkish citizens and immigrants in Turkey means growing outflows. It may also result in a change of direction for flows in certain migration corridors such as between Germany and Turkey which has been reversed since about 2006 as more people moved from Germany to Turkey (Sirkeci & Zeyneloğlu, 2014) .
Turkish citizens have become increasingly mobile as a result of established migration networks and existing migration culture as well as the relative prosperity and stability in the country since the turn of the 21 st century. Turkey is currently officially the largest refugee hosting country in the world, which perhaps is not a coincidence given its geographical proximity to major conflict zones in the world as well as its location at the periphery of the EU.
Turkey has long been a country of immigration and emigration; a country with a diaspora population of over 5 million dispersed across the world and with a refugee population of over 3 million in the country along with another 1.5 million foreign born according to official reports (Pusch & Sirkeci, 2016) . From 2011 onwards, the country saw substantial changes in its legislation and infrastructure to deal with migration. For example, a new migration management directorate was created alongside a set of new legislations drawing on the 2013 Law of Foreigners and International Protection (no. 6458) (Sağıroğlu, 2016) . As debates and negotiations continue on readmission agreements, visa free travel in the EU for Turkish citizens and burden sharing schemes (Sözen, 2016; Genç & Öner, 2016) , there are still ongoing processes that will affect migration policies as well as migration experiences in Turkey.
Historically, a combination of major conflicts, uneven development, and demographic pressures in Turkey has driven migration abroad. Turkish citizens, Turks, Kurds and others alike, have fled the country in large numbers to seek economic, cultural, and political security elsewhere (Sirkeci, 2003b) . Depending on the admission policies and international "deals" of the time, varying across destinations, they were reported as guest workers, family migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, imported brides, students, labour migrants, Ankara agreement movers, and adventurers. One may find several periodisations often based on these administrative categories (Sirkeci, 2005a) . Population movements were in response to labour market dynamics (e.g. Martin, 1991; Reniers, 1999) , or the Kurdish conflict (e.g. Sirkeci, 2006a; Başer, 2015) , or marriage and family connections (e.g. Kulu-Glasgow & Leerkes, 2013; Lievens, 1999) . Nevertheless, the common ground for all these movers were the discomforts, tensions and conflicts they considered as insecurity and found easier to overcome by voting with the feet. Many millions have returned, some re-migrated, but all these moves created a Turkish culture of migration consolidating migration corridors between several destinations and Turkey and over time diversifying the composition of flows in both directions.
Turkey has become increasingly prosperous since the 1980s with record levels of GDP growth in the 1990s and 2000s (World Bank, 2016) , while suffering from a protracted armed conflict with the Kurdish minority predominant in the East and South of the country. Nevertheless, the conflict over the Kurdish minority (Sirkeci, 2000 and 2003a) , increasing Islamisation (Kaya, 2015) , political polarisation (Dalay, 2015) under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) rule, and adverse influences of the Syrian and Iraqi crises with coinciding ISIS attacks in Turkey (Milan, 2016) , caused the country to swing towards insecurity again in the mid-2010s.
Turkey's Kurdish question is at least as old as the Republic dating back to the 1920s (Yeğen, 2007; Sirkeci, 2003b; McDowall, 1996) , and it has characterised a significant portion of migration outflows from Turkey ever since (Sirkeci, 2006a) . However, this became more apparent particularly from the 1980s through the 2000s, when 1,017,358 asylum applications were lodged by (mostly Kurdish origin) Turkish citizens in the industrialised countries (Sirkeci & Esipova, 2013:3) . In the 1960s and the 1970s, many members of minority groups including the Kurds along with left wing activists moved abroad as guest workers, workers' families, and students. In the 1980s, when the insecurity in Turkey was intensified with the 1980 military coup and the armed conflict with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), from 1984 onwards, seeking asylum became the only choice for many who could not satisfy the ever-tightening visa or work permit requirements of the destination countries.
Partly mixed with and certainly eclipsed by the Kurdish conflict, another major issue of insecurity in Turkey is that of the Alevis. Alevis are a heterodox Islamic population in Turkey with strong secularist characteristics, numbering around 20 million with a concentration in Central and Eastern provinces and some coastal areas in the south and west (Issa, 2017; Dressler, 2013; Massicard, 2013; Shankland, 2003; White & Jongerden, 2003) . Similar to Kurds, Alevis are overrepresented in the Turkish diaspora Issa, 2017) ; and they were heavily targeted by right wing groups in Turkey during the 1970s and onwards (Kosnick, 2004) .
The contemporary Turkish context is characterised by mass purges that followed the failed coup on 15 July 2016, Turkey's military incursions into Iraq and Syria, and intensified armed conflict with Kurdish guerrillas in the southeast Turkey. The lack of Kurdish and Alevi representation in politics and governance contributes to the growing frustration of the Kurds and secular people who are increasingly alienated. Since July 2016, there is an emergency rule, and by 12 presidential decrees, more than 80,000 people have been expelled, over 2,600 organisations including 15 universities shut down, 39,378 arrested out of 96,000 suspects investigated in relation to the failed coup attempt by 22 November 2016. These constitute key elements of the current democratic deficit in Turkey.
Democratic deficit, although, appears to be the key driver for most recent outflows from Turkey, development deficit and demographic deficit also play a part. For example, in 2015, Turkey ranked among the bottom four of the OECD in terms of its Gini coefficient; has nearly 20% of its population below the poverty line (which is 3 percentage points higher than the 1990s); and the richest 10% having about a 15 times higher income than the poorest 10% (Keeley, 2015) . Regional socio-economic development disparities remain strong (Gül & Çevik, 2015) and they are known to increase migration propensities . Demographic deficit in Turkey is characterised by disparities in fertility rate and in net migration across regions and between western and eastern provinces (Ediev & Yücesahin, 2016:382) . Total fertility rate in Turkey stands at 2.17 whilst it is 1.57 in the EU countries (Scherbov et al., 2016) . These three Ds combined with an existing Turkish culture of migration (Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016; Sirkeci, 2006a; 2006b ) is likely to direct Turks towards key European destinations such as Germany, France, Austria, UK, Sweden where strong diaspora communities exist.
Movers and refugees in Turkey
Turkey as a country of immigration and a "country of security" has attracted movers including refugees from around the world since its foundation in the 1920s. Officially, it is claimed that Turkey has received over 3 million applications for protection including Syrians and 2,442,159 regular movers with residence permits between 2002 and 2015.
5 Among regular movers, the returnees from countries like Germany or second and third generation Turks from these countries constituted the majority. German nationals constituted 32.5% of all foreigners in Turkey according to the 2000 census followed by Bulgarians with 13.4% for a total of 1,260,530 foreign born in the country, over 84% of whom were Turkish citizens born abroad (Sirkeci, Cohen, Can, 2012 and Zeyneloğlu, 2014) . (Sirkeci & Martin, 2014; GDMM, 2016) . Nevertheless, it has to be noted that asylum and migration statistics in Turkey are overall unreliable and inaccurate. Yet, it is clear that a sizeable foreign born population is present, particularly concentrated in large cities and coastal areas. Despite sizeable groups from Germany, Russia, and Britain are present among Turkey's immigrants, dominant nationalities in all immigration categories are Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans. In 2015, the top ten nationalities among the resident permit holders were all from Middle Eastern and former Soviet Union countries (Table 1) .
Compared to large Turkish diaspora populations in Europe and elsewhere, these numbers are significantly small. However, in the decade to 2015, in main corridors such as Germany and Turkey, net migration flows were reversed as the numbers arriving in Turkey had surpassed those leaving. Number of resident permit holders in Turkey was 422,895 in 2015 which was about 11% higher than 2014 and 35% higher than the 2013 figures 6 . 202,403 of them were for short term residence, 73,705 belonged to families, 67,529 to students and 62,756 were work permits. This paper focuses on refugees who are dominantly from Syria (2.8 million), Iraq (125,879), Afghanistan (113,756), Iran (28,534), and other countries (12, 195) . 7 In the last ten years, the number of asylum applications lodged in Turkey totals 216,351 in a gradually growing fashion until 2015, when the numbers suddenly doubled to 64,232 ( 9 In 2015 and 2016, number of human smugglers arrested has also sharply increased in Turkey from 1,506 in 2014 to 4,471 in 2015 (it was 3,052 in the 11 months, by 28 November 2016). Responding to the 2013 EU-Turkey readmission agreement, 468 individuals were readmitted from Greece to Turkey.
Syrians have become the largest immigrant group in Turkey and it is very likely that they will be the centre of attention in migration debates for the foreseeable future. Syrians have a young population with 38.7% younger than 15. This is significantly different than Turkey's age composition (in which the demographic group make up the 24% of the population). Among those younger than 55, the majority are males (53.3%) while among those 55 and over it is females (51.2%) (Figure 1 and Table A1 in Appendix). Syrian migration to Turkey needs to be considered in relation to Concentration in the border provinces of Kilis, Hatay, Sanliurfa, and Gaziantep is at alarmingly high levels where the ratio of Syrians to the usual resident population rises up to 93% (Appendix Table A2 ). This has enormous implications on public service provision and resources especially regarding schooling, health and housing provisions at the local level. For example, although only about 15% of Syrian children at school age were enrolled by July 2016 10 , to provide schooling for all of them at the same standards with Turkey's usual residents, it was estimated that government would need over 40,000 new classrooms and about 80,000 additional teachers. This strengthens the environment of insecurity and hence increases the out-migration pressures within the refugee population too. The impact of refugee arrivals on economy overall is yet inconclusive as there are both positive and negative influences observed in these provinces (see Lordoğlu & Aslan, 2015) . 10 According to the Education Ministry in Turkey, only 170,000 of 625,000 school-aged Syrian children living in Turkey were receiving formal education http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/less-than-onethird-of-syrian-children-in-turkey-in-formal-education.aspx?pageID=238&nID=101498&NewsCatID =341. Accessed 1/10/2016. (Table 3 ).
Turkey's deal with the EU and the 2013 readmission agreement are probably one of the reasons of a sudden surge in unauthorised border crossings from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria in the second half of 2015 and early 2016, since the agreement has a clause stating that the deal would come in force in three years. Thus to avoid being sent back, over one million of refugees risked their lives to leave Turkey before the agreement was implemented. So far only 2,655 Syrians have been resettled in the EU against the unauthorised migrants Turkey readmitted since April 2016 within rules of the EU-Turkey agreement. Half of these readmitted movers were from Pakistan and Afghanistan (DGMM, 2016) . While understanding foreigners in need of humanitarian protection in Turkey trying to leave the country, we should also look into the number of Turkish citizens applying for international protection elsewhere and Turkey as a country of insecurity.
Refugees from Turkey, a country of (in)security
Citizens of wealthier countries, which we may call "countries of security", also seek refuge elsewhere, but the numbers are negligible. For example, the number of German citizens applied for asylum in other countries were about 40-50 per annum over the period from 1999 to 2016. One of these countries of security, Turkey is also a country of insecurity with a steady outflow of refugees (Table A4 in Appendix). The total number of asylum seekers with Turkish citizenship in industrialised countries exceeded one million between the 1980 military coup and 2011 (Sirkeci & Esipova, 2013 ) and the total number from January 1999 till October 2016 was 233,091 ( Figure 3 ). Since the second half of 2015, there has been a sharp increase in the number of asylum applications by Turkish citizens abroad. For example, the volume of Turkish (first time) asylum applications in the EU countries had increased by 48% in the first quarter of 2016 and 100% in the second quarter (Eurostat, 2016) ; applications in the third quarter increased from 985 in 2015 to 3,779 in 2016. These trends show a possibly larger increase will follow in 2017 and onwards.
The striking feature that emerges in the trends shown in Figure 3 is the sudden but expected jump in asylum applications since July 2016, when the failed coup attempt was made. As seen in Table A3 in Appendix, between January and October 2016, the total number of asylum applications lodged by Turkish citizens was about 140% higher than the total in 2015. Applications between July and October in 2016 (5,161) quadrupled in comparison with the same period in 2015. The increase was even sharper in the case of Germany as the number of applications in 2016 was three and a half times higher than 2015 whilst the increase in the July-October period was 7 times (2,501) higher than that of the same period in 2015 (361).
This was expected within the conflict model of migration (Sirkeci, 2009) as the failed military coup in Turkey was followed by a mass purge by the government and hundreds of thousands of public workers including judges, police officers, and academics lost their jobs and many were arrested. This can be seen as the beginning of a period of increased asylum seeker flows from Turkey. Turkey has been one of the top source countries for asylum migration in the 1990s and early 2000s (Sirkeci, 2006; Sirkeci & Esipova, 2013) . Germany as the host country for the largest segment of Turkish populations abroad has been historically the main destination for asylum seekers, too. This is simply because, asylum seeking migration is only slightly different from any other migration in terms of administration but when it comes to the support of migrant networks, there is virtually no difference. Earlier research shows, for example that in Germany, that there was fluidity between categories such as guest workers and asylum seekers over time (Sirkeci, 2006) . Disproportionate numbers targeting Germany is likely to be partly due to the presence of a large Turkish diaspora in the country. 
Source: UNHCR. * Jan-Oct only
If we project the numbers for the rest of the year, as the situation in Turkey has been deteriorating, given that the total number of asylum applications continued at similar levels until the end of 2016, the numbers in Germany is likely to exceed 5,000 which is close to the levels in the early 2000s. Corresponding projected figure for all 38 European countries and 6 non-European destinations would take the tally for 2016 to about 11,500 at the end of the year. This negates Turkey's profile as a 'country of security'. This is alarming news since Turkey is increasingly unstable and highly polarised after the failed military coup, yet hosts over 3 million refugees. Given the selective nature of the purges (i.e. targeting professionals such as judges, academics, government officers) following the failed coup and emergency rule in place, these asylum seeker outflows from Turkey are likely to have involved high number of high skilled movers. These movers are capable and equipped with social and human capitals, hence are likely to overcome imposed barriers (e.g. costs, exit and entry restrictions). With the purges, government targeted high rank and high skilled groups such as 3,800 judges and prosecutors, and over 6,300 academics were among 115,000 people who lost their jobs and 82,000 who were detained. These are clear indicators of a brain drain risk for Turkey, but also an indication of a steady outflow of population in years to come. As suggested by the conflict model, the impact or repercussions (including emigration in response to it) of an environment of insecurity continues even after the original triggers of conflict disappears. It is also to be noted that this environment of insecurity affects not only Turkish citizens but immigrants including Syrian and other refugees in Turkey. Therefore, their flight will also continue despite all agreements between Turkey and the EU.
Conclusion
Turkey, once again, has become a country of origin for sizeable number of Turkish citizens filing asylum applications in industrialised countries and elsewhere. An environment of human insecurity has become more apparent in Turkey in 2016 after a relatively smooth period in the last decade. Yet, a country of (human) security, millions of Syrians and other refugees arrived and remained in Turkey, perhaps many hoping eventually to be resettled somewhere more stable and democratic. The Truce may stem further outflows from Syria but it would be naïve to expect significant numbers returning from Turkey or elsewhere back to Syria any time soon. Emerging Turkish-Syrian culture of migration would be just another driver to maintain flows from Syria to Turkey in the near future.
Coinciding with frequent terrorist attacks and occasional tensions with neighbouring countries, Turkey also faces an economic downturn marked by high inflation, high unemployment levels and slow (or negative) growth. Absence of competitive job markets and large regional disparities in development as well as high inequality levels highlight Turkey's Development Deficit. Situation in Syria was even worse and has deteriorated further during the civil war since 2011.
Development Deficit often goes along with Democratic and Demographic Deficits. Democratic Deficit is about political representation, or the lack of it. Countries such as Syria denied basic citizenship rights to segments of their residents. For example, the Kurds were denied passports by the Assad regime until 2011 when some were granted citizenship (CNN, 2011; HRW, 1996) . Similar democratic disenfranchisement was evident in Iraq under Saddam and an armed conflict with Kurds is still ongoing in Turkey. However, this does not have to be as drastic as in Syria. Long term frustration in politics where one group is disadvantaged and have no prospect of being involved in governance can create a perception of (political) insecurity leading people to consider moving elsewhere. Current circumstances in Turkey and tensions arising from an increasingly oppressive and authoritarian conservative government with strong religious tones imposing a kind of polity over a secular minority. Secularists and many other opposition groups in Turkey have already been frustrated with almost zero prospect of becoming an influential part of the governance. The purges and wider adverse effects of mass sackings, detentions and polarisation make the country an insecure place.
Demographic Deficit is about high fertility and high population growth rates in contrast to limited job and opportunity creation for a growing population. Most source countries in the developing world have high fertility rates and growing populations, whereas most destination countries have stagnant or declining populations characterised by ageing populations with low fertility levels. This contributes to emigration pressures at countries of high fertility. Turkey's fertility levels are relatively higher than its European neighbours and lower than Middle Eastern neighbours Syria and Iraq. This means that migration pressures and hence, inflows from Middle East and outflows to Europe are likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
These three deficits are the root causes of most human mobility we observe around the world today. Therefore, any policy attempt to tackle migration must address these three deficits, root causes of environment of human insecurity and thus drivers of migration, internal and international alike. Otherwise, it will be simply indulging into costly adventures such as building walls, fences, Frontex and deals with Turkey and other countries.
